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ABSTRACT 
We examine the perfonnance implications of selecting alternate modes of governance in inter-
organizational alliance relationships. While managers can choose from a range of modes to 
govern alliances, prior empirical evidence offers limited guidance on the perfonnance impact of 
this choice. We use an agent-based simulation of inter-firm decision making to complement 
empirical studies in tllis area. Our results point to a complex interplay between interdependencies, 
governance structures and finns' search capabilities: different patterns of interdependence create 
varying needs with respect to coordination and exploration, while at the same time different 
governance modes, coupled with organizational search capabilities, supply varying degrees of 
these factors; finn performance in an alliance relationship improves when the needs and supplies 
of coordination and exploration are matched. We find situations in which stronger organizational 
search capabilities can backfire, leading to lower exploration within the alliance relationship, and 
hence to lower firm perfonnance. Moreover we show that for higher levels of interdependence, 
coordination can become more critical for finn perfonnance than exploration: unless it is tied to 
coordination, exploration can be ineffective in alliance settings. 
Running Head: Governing Collaborative Activity 
Keywords: Alliances; governance modes; coordination; exploration; interdependence; simulation 
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INTRODUCTION 
Inter-firm collaborative relationships are a growing phenomenon with significant organizational 
and performance consequences (Reuer, 2004). Engaging in such relationships requires 
determining how to govern the shared activities -a particularly important consideration when the 
activities associated with the collaboration interact with the other activities of the participating 
finns. Broader finn-level consequences can often result from governance mode selection. In 
resource-constrained enviromnents, for example, firms may be unable to invest in the capabilities 
necessary to pursue different modes of governance across multiple alliance relationships. As a 
result, developing a business model around a single, particular mode can become a necessary 
strategic choice. 
While governance mode choice can have strategic implications, there is limited direct 
evidence for the impact of different modes on finn performance. Prior work in this area has 
generally addressed two issues: first, does cooperative activity matter? And second, what factors 
compel finns to select alternate modes of governance in cooperative settings? Empirical evidence 
for the implications of cooperative activity has been mixed: while some work documents the 
positive effects of such activity on firm perfonnance using metrics such as stock market returns 
(Das, Sen and Sengupta, 1998) and patenting output (Shan, Walker and Kogut, 1994), other 
studies suggest that cooperative activity plays a more limited role in influencing finn-level 
outcomes relative to factors such as internal capabilities (Lee, Lee and Pennings, 2001 ). More 
robust evidence exists with respect to the antecedent<> of such activity. Two streams of prior work 
have addressed the detenninants of alliance governance: a transaction cost economics (TCE) 
view, which generally concludes that more hierarchical fonns of governance are associated with 
transactions characterized by increased appropriation hazards (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997); 
and an organizational approach, which examines the choice between alternate modes of 
governance taking into account finn-level considerations (e.g., Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kale and 
Puranam, 2004; Dyer et al., 2004; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Aggarwal and Hsu, 2009). 
Although ample work has assessed alliance governance mode determinants, less is known 
about the perfonnance implications of difference modes. Sampson (2004) makes important 
headway toward<> addressing this by focusing on the implications of 'governance misalignment'. 
Using TCE as a theoretical prior, this study focuses on the innovation implications of governance 
choices that run counter to TCE predictions. The empirical finding that misaligned choices can 
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have adverse innovation effects is compelling, as it motivates the notion that mode choice has 
perfonnance effects detennined in part by the nature of inter-fmn characteristics. Moreover, it 
suggests the need for a deeper understanding of the mechanisms influencing finn performance as 
governance modes vary. 
Our central research question addresses this link between governance mode and 
perfonnance: how does the governance mode used to manage decisions in the context of an inter-
organizational relationship bet\-Veen t\-Vo firms impact firm performance? To examine this 
question, we employ an agent-based simulation that enables us to develop a more nuanced view 
of the implications of governance choice. Part of the motivation underlying this approach is to 
better understand some of the factors underlying the implications of cooperative activity that may 
be more difficult to address using empirical approaches. Prior studies exploring finn perfonnance 
in alliance settings, for example, have explored moderating effects such as alliance activity type 
(e.g. , marketing vs. technical) and relative fmn size, while abstracting away from the particular 
implications of finn characteristics and governance mode. Omitting such characteristics may be 
the reason for the mixed results around the implications of cooperative activity noted above. By 
utilizing a simulation methodology, we are afforded a degree of flexibility in experimental design 
not possible with alternative approaches. 
We use a simulation model with the aim of generating a novel set of insight<> (following 
from a set of assumptions) that can guide future theoretical and empirical work. To develop our 
model we draw from a rich body of literature that has used agent-based simulations to address 
issues of organizational strategy (e.g., Levinthal, 1997) and from prior work examining inter-
organizational relationships. We model a range of governance structures, different patterns of 
interdependencies, and varying levels of organizational capabilities. To anchor our analytical 
explorations, we first outline a conceptual framework of finn perfonnance, building on the 
information processing and contingency theories of the fmn. With this framework in mind, we 
then use the simulation to generate further insight into the mechanisms underlying the 
perfonnance effects of alternate governance modes. ln the final section, we discuss theoretical 
implications and outline several specific insights and hypotheses that emerge from this study. 1 
1 Many of the theoretical mechanisms we discuss might also be relevant in intra-firm settings, and our 
theoretical development and discussion moreover draw on a broad range of the organizational design literature 
examining within-firm issues. Since our focus is on alliance governance, however, we construct a s imulation 
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THEORY AND LITERATURE 
Our aim in this section is to develop a conceptual framework that describes a nmnber of 
mechanisms underlying finn performance in alliance settings. We begin by discussing 
governance mode choice and inter-finn interdependence; we then tum to the factors of 
coordination and exploration. We motivate our framework with a discussion of prior literature, 
including work on organization design and information processing. TI1e framework, in tum, 
motivates the simulation model discussed in the subsequent section. 
Governance modes and interdependence 
An important question in any inter-organizational relationship is how to govern the shared 
activities. An early stream of work examining the governance choice issue drew from transaction 
cost theory (Williamson, 1975; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). In this context, 
appropriation concerns arising from contractual hazards become a central consideration. Gulati 
and Singh (1998) pick up on this thread, discussing appropriation concerns as an important 
determinant of governance structure, while at the same time suggesting that coordination costs 
play an equally important role. They draw from the organization design literature (e.g., 
Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1977) to suggest that interdependence is a particularly important 
factor in determining how finns structure alliance relationships. Interdependence in an alliance 
setting can encompass factors such as sharing complementary teclmologies and production 
facilities, as well as joint product development (these are among the activities Gulati and Singh 
discuss in measuring interdependence). 
The importance of interdependence both among activities m which finns are jointly 
engaged and between tl1e finns ' alliance and non-alliance activities stems from the infonnation 
processing needs of the interacting firms. In his discussion of intra-organizational design, 
Galbraith (1977: 37) notes that "in order to coordinate interdependent roles, organizations have 
invented mechanisms for collecting infonnation, deciding, and disseminating infonnation to 
resolve conflicts and guide interdependent actions." Information plays a similar role in alliance 
model that more closely mirrors situations involving two distinct and interacting firms. As a result, we make 
assumptions around the nature of organizational interdependence and decision making that may be less 
appropriate for an intra-firm setting. 
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settings: just as greater levels of internal interdependence lead to higher task uncertainty and 
increased infonnation processing need<> within an organization (Tushman and Nadler, 1978), 
greater levels of interdependence within and between the activities of fmns in an alliance lead to 
higher alliance-related infonnation processing needs. As a result, alliance design choices are 
driven by the need to capture and effectively manage interdependence-related infonnation. 
Bounded rationality (Simon, 1945; Cyert and March, 1963) in many ways underpins the 
information processing perspective: if actors were unboundedly rational, a single decision maker 
could simply optimize across all combinatorial possibilities; yet with limits on individual 
information processing ability, a more decentralized approach will likely prevail (Mintzberg 
1979). ln the context of alliance relationships, therefore, firms are likely to (at least partially) 
decentralize decision making in order to deal with infonnation flows arising from inter-firm 
interdependence. As prior work examining within-firm organizational structures has 
demonstrated, infonnation flows are a core consideration in optimally configuring organizations, 
particularly with varying levels of decomposability (Burton and Obel, 1980; Simon, 1996). More 
generally , just as environmental contingencies drive different choices of within-finn organization 
(e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) we would expect that no single alliance governance choice 
would apply equally effectively across all circumstances. Varying infonnation processmg 
requirements associated with different patterns of interdependence between finns will likely 
necessitate employing alternative structures to govern the associated decisions. This discussion 
therefore suggests: 
• Proposition 1. The pattern ofactivity interdependence beflveenfirms in an alliance 
creates performance differences among different alliance governance modes. 
Coordination, exploration and firm performance 
To understand how interdependence can influence the link between governance choice and 
perfonnance, we seek to better understand the levers that finns employ to influence performance 
in alliance settings. Coordination is one such lever: the nature and functioning of coordination 
mechanisms and the associated failures to appropriately coordinate activities have been a central 
set of concerns for both the classic and the more recent organization design literature (e.g., 
Simon, 1945; Galbraith, 1977, Burton and Obel, 1984; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). While 
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many of these studies have focused on intra-finn interactions, work going back to (at least) 
Schelling (1960) has discussed issues of coordination across multiple organizations. 1n the 
particular context of alliance relationships, Gulati and Singh (1998) suggest that firms take into 
account coordination concerns in making governance mode decisions. Moreover, a recent stream 
of alliance research looking at finn adaptation and the development of routines over time 
suggests that the ability to effectively coordinate activities among finns can be an important 
driver of firm perfonnance (e.g., Zollo et al. (2002), Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam (2005)). 
1n addition to the ability to coordinate among activities, a firm's ability to explore and 
find new activities can be an important driver of performance in an alliance. Exploration is a core 
element of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), with search processes 
critical to a firm's ability to adapt and evolve (Nelson and Winter, 1982; March, 1991; Levinthal, 
1997). As March (1991) suggests, exploration, a concept captured by ideas such as "search, 
variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation," is critical for 
organizations. Moreover, search can be exploratory to varying degrees, from narrow, local search 
to broader search. The drivers of exploration have been addressed in a growing body of work, 
with factors such as organizational structure shown to play an important role (e.g., Siggelkow and 
Rivkin, 2005, 2006 and references therein). We build on this work in the present study, while at 
the same time shifting the focus to exploration in an inter-organizational setting.2 
The prior literature suggests, therefore, that coordination and exploration have important 
effects on finn performance. Moreover, the degree of coordination and exploration that will be 
required in an alliance setting is, in turn, likely to be influenced by the pattern of inter-firm 
interdependence: greater interdependence increases the challenges of coordination (e.g., 
Galbraith, 1977) and requires a higher degree of exploration because interdependencies create 
more rugged perfonnance landscapes that can cause firms to get stuck with very suboptimal 
choices (e.g., Levinthal, 1997). This discussion therefore suggests: 
2 Our definition of "exploration" refers to organizational actions related to finding new activity configurations. 
Our use of the term exploration is thus consistent with what is more generally termed "search" in prior literature 
(see, e.g. , Siggelkow and Rivkin ·s (2006) discussion of exploration) . March's (1991) further distinction between 
exploitation and exploration is embedded implicitly in our model (see below), as we vary the breadth of search 
undertaken by managers from narrow (akin to "exploitation" ) to broad (akin to "exploration" in March's (1991) 
more particular sense) . 
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• Proposition 2a. D(ff"erent patterns o{"activity interdependence befl~v·eenjirms create 
different need~ .for coordination and exploration in an alliance relationship. 
While interdependence patterns create varying needs for coordination and exploration, the 
supply of these factors is influenced both by the alliance governance structure and by 
organizational capabilities. More specifically, in alliance relationships, a primary consideration is 
the degree of autonomy held by the individual finns. Two core considerations in such a setting 
are ( 1) the infonnation flows enabling individual actors to make decisions, and (2) the over-
arching processes governing these decisions. We refer to the collective set of factors that 
characterize the underlying infonnation flow and decision processes as the alliance governance 
structure, and suggest that the particular structure employed influences the supply of coordination 
and exploration in inter-organizational relationships. We discuss these structures in more detail in 
the following section. 
Beyond the particular governance structure employed, internal firm capabilities are also 
likely to play an important role. A broad stream of the organizational strategy literature has 
focused on the role of capabilities in the fonnation, governance and performance of collaborative 
relationships (e.g., Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002; Zollo et al., 2002; Colombo, 2003; Leiblein and 
Miller, 2003; Mayer and Salomon, 2006). 1n this paper, we conceptualize capabilities as a set of 
factors that enable an organization to engage, to varying degrees, in the search for better 
configurations of performance-relevant activities. We use the term "organizational search 
capabilities" to denote these factors in our conceptual framework and simulation model.3 Such 
capabilities represent the end product of investments by firms in their ability to generate new 
ideas and evaluate alternative courses of action. As a result, these capabilities may be static in the 
context of an individual alliance relationship, but adjustable over time as fmns alter their 
investments in decision evaluation resources. This discussion thus suggests that as finns seek to 
respond to the coordination and exploration needs arising from inter-finn interdependence they 
will draw on the joint effects of governance modes and organizational search capabilities. As a 
result, we have: 
3 We defer a more detailed discussion of these capabilities to the Simulation Model section, where we describe 
the particular types of such capabilities we model in this paper. 
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• Proposition 2h. D([f'erent governance structures and organizational search capabilities 
supply· different degrees of coordination and exploration in an alliance relationship. 
Finally, as much ofthe organizations literature (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 
1977; Burton and Obel, 1995; Volberda, 1996) collectively indicates, higher performance stems 
from situations in which firms are adequately equipped to deal with the demands arising from 
their particular form of interdependence. As our discussion has suggested, in the case of alliance 
relationships, coordination and exploration are core considerations. Moreover, as Tushman and 
Nadler ( 1978: 6 19) note, "too much capacity will be redundant and costly; too little capacity will 
not get the job done". Thus, finns in an alliance will be more likely to achieve higher 
perfonnance when tl1ey are able to strike a balance between the needs and supply of coordination 
and exploration. This discussion thus suggests: 
• Proposition 3. Firm performance in an alliance relationship improves when coordination 
and exploration need~ are matched with the degree of coordination and exploration 
supplied. 
The conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1 summarizes our discussion thus far: The 
demands for coordination and exploration are inherently influenced by the pattern of 
interdependence among the activities in which the finns involved in the inter-organizational 
relationship are engaged. As interdependence increases, so too will the need to coordinate actions 
among finns; similarly, a higher degree of interdependence will create greater landscape 
complexity, necessitating higher levels of exploration (e.g., Levinthal, 1997). While 
interdependence has implications for coordination and exploration demands, governance m ode 
and organizational search capabilities have supply implications for these factors: mode choice 
affects the nature and extent of coordination among firms, as well as the ability of firms to 
explore their environment. Likewise, organizational search capabilities affect the supply of 
exploration and, in tl1e interplay witl1 tl1e chosen governance mode, coordination. We turn in the 
next section to describing a simulation model that enables us to explore this framework in greater 
detail. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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SIMULATION MODEL 
To develop our simulation model, we build on and extend prior work that has used the NK 
framework (Kauffinan, 1993) to model firm decision making (e.g., Levinthal, 1997; Lenox, 
Rockart and Lewin, 2006). This literature generally envisions firms as sets of interdependent 
choices, an approach characteristic of an activity systems view of organizations (Porter, 1996; 
Siggelkow, 2001, 2002). ln particular, a firm is seen as having to resolve a set of N 'policy 
choices. ' For instance, a finn may have to decide whether to increase its product variety, whether 
to engage in various marketing campaigns, or whether to increase it<> budget for sales force 
training. The NK model further assumes that the benefit that is derived from each policy choice is 
affected by K other policy choices. For instance, the value that an increase in product variety may 
generate could depend on whether the sales force has been recently trained, or not. ln sum, each 
unique configuration of tl1e N choices generates a particular perfonnance value. Thus, we can 
imagine a perfonnance landscape on N+ 1 dimensions: N 'horizontal ' dimensions representing the 
space of all possible alternatives for each of tl1e N policy choices, and one 'vertical' dimension 
representing tl1e perfonnance level resulting from each overall choice configuration (of tl1e N 
decisions). Landscape complexity depends on interactions among the policy choices, and firms 
search the landscape attempting to move to higher perfonnance levels by altering individual 
choices. 
The two principal components of NK models are tlms ( 1) a mechanism to create 
perfonnance landscapes (i.e. , tl1e mapping from choices to performance), and (2) a set of decision 
rules that describe how fmns search the landscape (i.e., how finns generate and assess alternative 
choice configurations). ln describing our model, we focus first on extending the concepts of 
interdependence and perfonnance landscapes to a two-finn setting. We then discuss our model of 
search and governance in tl1is context. 
Patterns of interdependence 
We model two firms interacting witl1in the context of an alliance relationship. Finns 1 and 2 are 
each composed of a set of binary policy choices which we denote as F 1 and F:J. We decompose 
the policy choice sets of each finn into two groups: ( 1) non-alliances choices under the control of 
the respective finn and (2) choices that are part of the alliance relationship. For Finn 1, we tlms 
have F 1 = {NJ. A 1 } , where N 1 represents the set of non-alliance choices, and A 1 represents the set 
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of alliance-dedicated activities in which Finn 1 is engaged. For example, an R&D alliance 
between two teclmology firms might consist of joint work towards a particular product. Choices 
with respect to this R&D alliance that Finn 1 has to resolve, e.g., whether or not to dedicate a 
particular engineer to this alliance, would be included in A1. Other choices that do not fall into tl1e 
province of the alliance such as how much to invest in branding an existing product would be 
included in N1. We denote the number of policy choices in sets N 1 and A 1 with n1 and a1, and 
define analogous values for Finn 2. TI1e total number of policy choices in the system oftwo finns 
is thus N = n1+a 1+aJ+nJ. 
Having defined the policy choices for each finn, we can define the pattern of interactions 
among them. Figure 2a illustrates an interaction matrix for two finns with n 1=4, a 1=2, aJ=2, and 
nJ=4. TI1e matrix specifies which policy choices are affected by which other choices. An X in row 
i, columnj, signifies that the resolution of the j th policy choice affects the value of the / 11 policy 
choice. Using this matrix, we can specify exactly which policy choices affect which other policy 
choices. For instance, in the example given in Figure 2a, d1 is affected by d1 through d.~ - Likewise, 
d 9 is affected by d5 through dn For ease of notation, we denote individual policy decisions by d;, 
where i is indexed from 1 toN, and sequentially number the decisions in the sets N 1, A 1, AJ, and 
NJ. Thus for Figure 2a, we have N 1=(d1,dJ,d3,d4) , A 1=(d5,d6) , AJ=(d7,d8) , and NJ=(d9,d10,d11 ,dJJ). 
We further define the full vector of decisions in the entire system of the two fmns as d = (d1, 
dJ, .. . , dN)- Since decisions are binary, dis thus a string of N O's and 1 's. 
To analyze the role played by different patterns of interdependence on optimal 
governance mode choice, we construct a set of specific interdependence patterns. These patterns 
follow a logical sequence, increasing in overall complexity, with the differences between any two 
consecutive patterns arising from the addition of a particular type of interdependence. Figure 2b 
shows the patterns we use, with shaded areas representing the presence of interactions. (Each 
shaded "box" in Figure 2b is completely filled with X 's.) We model a system of 12 policy 
choices with n 1=4, a1=2, aJ=2 and nJ=4. Pattern 1 is "fully decomposable," i.e., it has interactions 
occurring solely within each group of policy choices. For instance, choices in N 1 only affect other 
choices in N 1; similarly for choices in A 1, AJ, and N J. Pattern 2, "pure alliance interaction," 
introduces interactions among the alliance choices of the two finns, i.e. , between A 1 and AJ. Tims, 
in this pattern all the activities within the alliance affect each other, but none of the alliance 
activities interact with any of the non-alliance activities. Pattern 3, "finn-alliance interaction," 
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introduces interactions among all the alliance and non-alliance choices within each fmn. Thus, in 
this case, choices within A1 and A:? interact with choices within N 1 and N.J. All activities within the 
alliance continue to interact with each other. (The pattern depicted in Figure 2a corresponds to 
Pattern 3.) Lastly, in Pattern 4, "full interdependence," all activities, even the non-alliance 
activities of the two finns interact with each other.4 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Performance landscapes 
We turn next to the mechanism for assessing perfonnance in our model. Prior literature (e.g., 
Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003) has used the ' contributions' of individual policy 
choices to describe perfonnance in an NK setting. We follow a similar approach. For each policy 
choice d,. in our system, we construct a contribution value function, C,.. The contribution value 
function takes as arguments each of the k;+ 1 choices affecting d; (this includes d; itself, as well as 
the other k; choices affecting d; as defined by the interaction matrix). Each contribution value 
function C,. is constructed as follows: for each unique configuration of policy choice d,. and the k,. 
other choices affecting it, we draw a random 'contribution value' from the unifonn distribution 
[0,1 ].5 Once all possible contribution values for each individual choice are defmed, the 
perfonnance for any particular set of policy choices is computed as tl1e sum of the contribution 
values associated witl1 these choices. 
To reduce statistical artifacts that could arise from the stochastic nature ofthe landscape 
generation process, we nonnalize perfonnance by the highest value possible on any given 
landscape. Let d* be the policy choice configuration that leads to the highest perfonnance IT*, 
i.e., IT*= L:~, C;(d*). Then, for instance, if the performance of Finn 1 is dctcnnincd only by the 
contributions of the first six policy choices, the performance of Finn 1 for any choice 
configuration dis given by L::~, C; (d) jrr * . In the case of an alliance between Finn 1 and Finn 2 
4 While this set of patterns is not exhau~tive of the full set of possible interdependencies, they are sufficient for 
our purpose in that they enable us to create varying types of coordination needs that we can then systematically 
examine. 
5 As an example, if the interaction matrix has 8 X's in row i (including the X in column i), then the contribution 
value function C; can take on 2R=256 possible values for C; depending on how the vector d is configured (i.e., 
C,( d) will depend only on the values of the 8 choices noted by X's in the interaction matrix). 
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involving policies 4 through 8, Finn l's performance would be detennined by the contributions 
of both Finn 1 's non-alliance policy choices (d1 through d4) and by the policy choices of the 
alliance (d5 through d8). For instance, if Finn l obtains portion a of the alliance perfonnance, 
Finn l 's overall perfonnance would be computed as (L::=I C ; (d) + aL:~=5 C, (d) )jrr * . 
Agents and search capabilities 
We tum now to the set of decision making rules that govern agents' behavior in our simulation. 
We define an agent as a decision maker having authority over some subset of policy choices in 
the two-finn system. For in..-;tance, a particular agent might have authority (and care about the 
perfonnance of) all of the non-alliance activities of Finn 1. One should note that we use the tenn 
"agent" for expositional simplicity. An "agent" in our model need not be (and in practice rarely 
would be) a single person. An agent in our model is the relevant "decision-making-body" that is 
responsible for making decisions concerning a set of activities, and thus could be a steering 
committee, a set of managers, etc. 
For a given simulation run, we begin by placing the agents at a random point on the 
landscape (i.e., assigning random starting values to their policy choices). In each subsequent 
period, the agents make decisions whether to alter the policy choices under their control (i.e., to 
change a policy from a 0 to l , or vice versa). This is done by evaluating a set of possibilities, 
which is influenced by the organizational search capabilities, and selecting the best option from 
this set. The detennination of what constitutes a 'best option' is, as we will describe below, 
dependent on the particular governance structure. Before discussing the governance structures in 
more detail, we describe our conceptualization of organizational search capabilities, which we 
model as the ability of agents to generate and evaluate alternative configurations for the set of 
policy choices they control. This set of parameters can be thought of as the degree to which 
organizational decision-making units are endowed with resources necessary to make decisions in 
an alliance context. 
We model two dimensions of such capabilities: (1) the ability to make simultaneous 
decisions over a larger vs. smaller nmnber of the policy choices controlled, which we term the 
'search radius ' as per prior literature (e.g., Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005), and (2) the ability to 
evaluate a larger vs. smaller nmnber of alternatives in a given period. 
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For the search radius (parameter SR), we model a base case in which agents can change 
only a single policy choice in each period (SR = 1), as well as a more complex case in which 
agents can change up to two policy choices simultaneously in each period (SR = 2). For the 
nmnber of alternatives (parameter ALT), we model a case where agents only evaluate a single, 
randomly chosen alternative in each period (ALT = 1), as well as a more complex case where all 
alternatives that lie within the search radius are evaluated (ALT =max). For example, assume an 
agent controls three policies that are currently configured as 000. lfthe agent 's search radius is 1, 
and she evaluates all alternatives, she considers 100, 010, and 001. 1f she evaluates only a single 
alternative, she will randomly pick one oftl1ese, e.g., 010. lfher search radius is 2, she can also 
consider options that are different from tl1e current configuration in two policies such as 110. In 
this case, were she to evaluate all alternative in her search radius, she would evaluate iC + ~C 
= 6 alternatives. ln sum, we model four different levels of organizational capabilities. Level A: 
SR = 1 & ALT = 1; Level B: SR = 1 & ALT =max; Level C: SR = 2 & ALT = 1; Level D: SR = 
2 &ALT=max. 
Governance modes 
We turn next to the different governance modes, which detennine the specifics of the decision 
making process. We construct these modes along four dimensions: (1) number of decision makers 
(agents), (2) order of decision making, (3) metrics used to evaluate the implications of choices, 
and ( 4) nature of oversight and hierarchy around the decision making process. These dimensions 
represent key elements of organization and alliance design (Simon, 1945; Galbraith, 1977; Reuer, 
2004), enabling us to create a range of governance modes tlmt differ in tl1e underlying 
information flow within and across organizations. We discuss the motivation underlying each 
dimension and the resulting governance modes in tl1e remainder of this section. 
The number of decision makers in the system is an important dimension of variance in 
structuring alliance governance. Since we are modeling a two-finn system, having two separate 
decision makers, one for each fmn, is a natural baseline. Alternatively, a more integrated level of 
governance might entail having a single decision maker, while a situation in which there are two 
decision makers for the finns, along with a third decision maker for tl1e alliance function, would 
be a natural characteristic of hybrid governance fonns. A three-agent model might thus have a 
decision-making body specific to alliance policy choices (e.g., a joint committee from both firms 
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managing the alliance activities). As a second dimension of variance we consider the question of 
how decision making is ordered, i.e., who gets priority in the decision making process. Decision 
making order has implications for information flow within organizations, and as discussed in 
depth in the previous section, such issues are likely to be central to the governance of inter-
organizational relationships. 
The third dimension of variance relates to the metrics used by individual agents to make 
decisions. Such decision metrics can be thought of as the incentives for individual organizational 
units, which derive from the particular contractual features of the alliance (e.g. , Robinson and 
Stuart, 2007). We model decision metrics (which are defined solely by the governance mode) as 
the set of contribution values an agent takes into account in making choices. As an example, in 
one particular governance mode an agent will consider just the contribution values of the 
decisions over which she has control. In an alternate governance mode, the agent will consider 
not only the contribution values of her own decisions, but also some portion of the contribution 
values of other agents' decisions. 6 
Finally, the fourth dimension of variance w e consider is the nature of hierarchy among 
agents in the model. Alliances can incorporate elements ofhierarchical governance (e.g. , Hennart 
1993) such that decisions taken by one agent need to be ratified by another before they can be 
implemented. Such hierarchy can, like the decision metrics, derive from the particular contractual 
arrangements of the alliance. It is different, however, in that it describes the overall organization 
of decision-making within the organization, rather than the more narrowly-prescribed underlying 
incentives for individual agents. 
Having described the four dimensions along which we model the governance of a 
particular relationship, we now describe the governance structures we use in our analysis (Figure 
3). We model four structures, which we tenn 'modular', 'self-governing alliance' , 'ratified 
alliance', and 'integrated'. The modular and integrated fonns lie at opposite ends of the 
governance spectrum. With the modular form, there are two agents, each controlling the policy 
6 Defining agents ' decision metrics in this way implies that we abstract away from a direct analysis of factors 
such as shirking that may result from, for example, under-enforcement of contracts. Although agents do act 
opportunistically in that their profit calculations consider only their own pre-defined set of contribution values to 
the possible detriment of the other agents and the system as a whole, we do not directly model situations where 
issues of trust are at play, or where agents directly seek to mislead. This is consistent with the notion of self-
interest in, for example Klein, Crawford and Alchian ( 1978), but may not include the ' guile' component of 
Williamson's ( 1975) definition of opportunism, where there are hazards associated with the contract it'ielf. 
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choices of either Finn 1 or Finn 2 (thus, in our model, six policy choices for each agent). These 
agents make choices simultaneously, and only consider the profits for their own finn in making 
decisions, L;~, C; (d ) jrr. * and L;~7 C; (d) jrr. * , respectively . This is a simple case of an anns-
length inter-organizational relationship with no formal decision making structure to govern joint 
activities. At the other end of the spectrum, we have the integrated mode, where a single agent 
manages choices for both Finns 1 and 2 (thus, 12 total policy choices in our model). In this case, 
the agent takes into account the total combined profit of Finns 1 and 2, L;~, C;(d) jrr. * , and the 
individual finns thus operate as a quasi-integrated entity. 
In addition, we model two hybrid alliance fonns, both of which have an alliance manager 
who manages the alliance choices (the four choices in the sets A1 and AJ in our model), while 
agents for Firms 1 and 2 manage the non-alliance choices of the two finns (N 1 and NJ 
respectively). ln both cases, the alliance function takes into account only its own profits 
L:=
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C; (d) jrr. * when making decisions. Each individual finn, in turn, takes into account the 
profits associated with its own choices, along with a portion ( a) of the alliance profit (we set a 
to 'l2 m our analysis), 1.e., (L::,c; (d) +~L;=5 C,(d))/rr * for Firm and 
( ""
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C, (d) +.!_""x _C, (d)) /rr.* for Finn 2. The main difference between the two alliance L-..,=9 2 L...,=) I, 
modes lies in the degree of importance placed on the agendas of the individual finns relative to 
the agenda of the alliance. ln the self-governing alliance mode, the alliance agent is allowed to 
move first, and the agents for Finns 1 and 2 move second, knowing the alliance's move in the 
current period. Thus, in this governance mode, the agenda of the alliance is given a high priority. 
By contrast, in the ratified alliance mode, the agents for Finns 1 and 2 move first, 
followed by the alliance agent, who knows the choices made by the two fmns in the current 
period. The alliance agent, however, cannot directly implement changes in policy choices. Rather, 
the agent ranks tl1e available alternatives and sends this ranked set to the two finn agents, who 
must 'ratify ' the alliance agent's proposals. Ratification requires tlmt both firm agents accept an 
alliance proposal; a fmn agent accepts a proposal if the proposal does not reduce profit for the 
agent (conditional on the move the agent already made at the start of the period). In this case, the 
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agendas of Firms 1 and 2 come first, and are accounted for as the alliance proposals are 
considered. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We begin this section by explaining our analytic approach and presenting a number of initial 
results. We then focus on interdependence, governance structure and capabilities in more detail, 
outlining how these factors impact the demand and supply of coordination and exploration. In this 
context, we develop a set of metrics for coordination and exploration that allow us to more 
precisely show the underlying mechanisms at work. With these metrics, we then discuss the 
mechanisms underlying the relationship between appropriate governance choice and patterns of 
interdependence. 
Analytic approach and motivating results 
We conducted a broad range of simulations aimed at understanding the implications of joint 
variation in interdependence, exploration ability and governance mode. As noted previously, we 
model a 12-policy choice system of 2 finns in which n1=4, a1=2, a]=2, and n]=4. Since the 
system itself, along witl1 the factors we model (like the patterns of interdependence), is symmetric 
for botl1 firms, tl1e perfonnance results for tl1e two finns in tl1e system are equal when run over a 
large nmnber of landscapes. To facilitate comparison with the integrated structure (which is 
comprised of all 12 policy choices), we report v alues for tl1e full system. Perfonnances of 
individual finns are simply Y2 oftl1e values reported for tl1e entire system. 
Each 'period' in the simulation consists of the agents making a set of decisions with 
respect to their activities as per the governance mode under which they are operating (see Figure 
3).7 We run tl1e simulation for 200 periods on a given landscape in order to observe the long-run 
perfonnance of tl1e fmns in tl1e system. To ensure that our results are not driven by statistical 
7 For example, with the Ratified Alliance mode, the following happens within a single period: the agents for 
Finns 1 and 2 simultaneously make a decision with respect to their activity sets N1 and N2; the alliance then 
evaluates a lternatives for their activity set A 1-A2 (taking into account the new choices within N1 and N 2) and 
sends a ranked set of the alternatives to the agents for Firms 1 and 2. Finally, the Firm 1 and 2 agents decide 
whether to ratify the choice made by the alliance. 
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artifacts, we repeat each simulation 10,000 times. Thus any reported performance value for a 
particular time period (e.g., period 200) on a particular pattern of interdependence is an average 
over 10,000 simulation runs (i.e., landscapes). In general, except where explicitly noted 
otherwise, reported perfonnance differences are statistically significant at the 1% (or lower) 
confidence level. 
We begin the analysis by examining the perfonnance outcomes of the various governance 
fonns under Pattern 1, the fully decomposable pattern. Figure 4 illustrates the performance of the 
four governance modes on this interdependence pattern for the four different levels of 
organizational capability. For capability level A (narrow search radius and one alternative 
evaluated in each period), in the short run, the integrated mode has the lowest level of 
perfonnance, while the alliance modes perfonn best. (For this pattern, the two alliance modes 
generate the same performance; hence their lines are indistinguishable in the Figure.) In the long 
run, however, each of the governance modes converges to the same level of perfonnance. A 
broadening ofthe search radius (moving from capability level A to level C) preserves the relative 
short-run differences between governance modes, while enabling each of the modes to arrive at a 
higher long-run level of performance. An increase in the number of alternatives (moving from 
level A to level B, or from C to D) increases the speed with which the governance forms 
converge to the long-run maximum, yet does not affect the level of the long-run perfonnance. 
The Pattern 1 results are directly l inked to its decomposable nature, i.e., to the fact that there 
are no interdependencies either between the individual finns and the alliance, or between the 
finns themselves. As a result, perfonnance speed is driven by the number of agents in the system, 
since each agent is able to act in parallel and independent of the others. The integrated structure, 
which relies on one central agent to make all decisions, thus has the lowest short-run 
perfonnance, while the two alliance forms, each of which has three agents who can work in 
parallel, have the highest short-run performance. The modular fonn, with two agents, falls in the 
middle. In the long run, however, given that the system can be fully decomposed, each mode 
eventually arrives at the same perfonnance level. Changes in organizational capability operate as 
expected: an increase in the number of alternatives increases the speed with which each mode 
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mcreases its perfonnance, while an increased search radius enables all finns to reach higher 
perfonnance levels over time.8 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Turning next to Figure 5, we examine the perfonnance of the different governance modes 
on Pattern 4 , the fully interdependent pattern, applying the same varying levels of organizational 
capabilities as before. Here, the results are much more complex. Turning first to the case of 
capability level A , we see that in contrast to the Pattern 1 case, performance across the four 
governance modes differs in the long run. In addition, modes vary in their relative performance 
over time. The integrated mode initially outperfonns the other three modes; in the long run, 
however, it is the lowest perfonning mode. The modular fonn, by contrast, initially 
underperforms, but is the best in the long run. Likewise, as we vary organizational capabilities, 
we can observe complex changes: an increase in either search radius or the munber of alternatives 
that are considered in each period is beneficial to the integrated fonn in the long run. By contrast, 
the modular fonn suffers as organizational capabilities are increased along either of these 
dimensions. Lastly, while tl1e self-governing alliance outperfonns the ratified all iance when the 
nmnber of considered alternatives is high (capability levels B and D), the ratified alliance has 
higher perfonnance, at least in the short run, when the search radius is high and the nmnber of 
considered alternatives is low (capability level C). 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
The results of Patterns 1 and 4 illustrate several points. First, we find initial support for 
Proposition 1: patterns of interdependence can have a significant impact on the relative value of 
individual governance modes. Second, once the pattern of interdependence is not simple 
anymore, the relationship between governance mode and perfonnance is not triv ial, especially 
when one takes into account different levels of organizational capabilities and measures 
perfonnance at different time points. To gain a better understanding of the results, and to identify 
8 Since interdependencies exist within the set of activities each manager controls (e.g., within N 1), each manager 
still may get stuck on a local peak within her ' sub-landscape.' An increase in the search radius reduces the 
probability that managers will get stranded on such low, local peaks, and hence increases long-run performance . 
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the underlying mechanisms that create tllis complex set of findings, it is helpful to retum to our 
conceptual model of coordination and exploration. In particular, we will describe in detail the 
demands tlmt different patterns of interdependence create with respect to coordination and 
exploration and how well the different governance modes match these demands. As we will 
show, the degree to which coordination and exploration demands are matched can help explain 
observed perfonnance heterogeneity. 
Coordination and exploration as underlying mechanisms 
To study the effect of interdependence patterns on the performance created by different 
governance modes, we focus on how particular patterns differ systematically in where 
interdependencies occur: between alliance and non-alliance choices; within alliance policy 
choices; and between the non-alliance choices of tl1e two firms. These three classes of 
interdependencies create three corresponding dimensions of coordination demands: ( 1) 
coordination between tl1e individual finns and the alliance; (2) coordination within tl1e alliance 
itself; and (3) coordination between tl1e non-alliance activities of Finns 1 and 2. As summarized 
in Panel A of Table 1, the only coordination required by Pattern 1 is among a few choices within 
the alliance, i.e., witl1in A 1 and within A2• Pattern 2, which contains also interactions between the 
alliance activities of the individual firms (i.e., between A1 and A 2) , requires more intra-alliance 
coordination. Pattern 3 requires additional coordination between the individual firms ' and the 
alliance activities. Finally, Pattern 4 demands coordination between the non-alliance activities for 
Finns 1 and 2 as well. 
Patterns 1 - 4 not only differ in their locations of interdependencies, but also in the 
nmnber of interdependencies. Generally, the larger tl1e number of interdependencies, tl1e more 
"rugged" a performance landscape becomes, i.e. , the more local peaks it contains (e.g., Levinthal, 
1997). (A policy configuration d is a local peak if all policy configurations that differ from d in 
only one policy choice have lower perfonnance.) The higher the number of local peaks, the 
higher the risk of getting stranded on a low-perfonning local peak; and consequently, the higher 
the level of exploration needed to reach high performance. As a result, the nmnber of local peaks 
tl1at are contained in a landscape is a good measure for exploration demands. The right-most 
colmnn of Panel A of Table 1 contains tl1e nmnber of local peaks for each interdependence 
pattern. As expected, the number oflocal peaks increases from 18 for Pattern 1 to 315 for Pattern 
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4. (For companson, a landscape with 12 policy choices has i 2 = 4,096 possible policy 
configurations.) In sum, the patterns differ in the types and degree of coordination, as well as the 
degree of exploration they demand. 
We now tum our attention to the different governance modes. Variation across these 
modes along the four key design dimensions (nmnber of agents; order of decision making; 
decision evaluation metrics; and oversight and hierarchy) generates substantial differences in the 
types and degree of coordination. To facilitate comparison with the different types of 
coordination that are demanded by the different interdependence patterns, Panel B of Table 1 
smmnarizes the coordination that is supplied by the different governance structures along the 
three coordination dimensions (individual firm-alliance; within alliance; and between Firms 1 and 
2). 
The modular mode supplies very little coordination along any of the coordination 
dimensions. Non-alliance activ ities are completely uncoordinated between the two finns as 
decisions are made simultaneously and purely independently of one another. Likewise, the 
modular mode has very little within-alliance coordination. Since own-finn alliance activ ities are 
controlled by each firm (for instance Finn 1 controls d5 and ~), a limited amount of coordination 
is created between at least a subset of alliance activities (i.e., Finn 1 coordinates between d5 and 
d6, and Finn 2 between d7 and d8). Similarly, only limited coordination occurs between alliance 
activities and the non-alliance activities of each firm. For instance, Finn 1 coordinates between 
d1-<4 and ds and d6, but ignores the interactions between d1-<4 and d7 and ds. 
Within the self-governing alliance, strong coordination is achieved among the alliance 
activities, since they are all controlled by a single alliance agent. A small amount of coordination 
also occurs between the non-alliance activ ities and the alliance activities. This coordination arises 
from the sequential moves within a given period and from the individual ±inns' taking into 
account a portion (a.) of tl1e alliance performance in making their decisions. Thus, when finn 
managers make decisions concerning the non-alliance activities, they would not implement policy 
changes that (drastically) undermine alliance performance. No coordination, however, is achieved 
between the non-alliance activities of both finns. 
The ratification alliance mode adds more coordination; here, in addition to the 
coordination sources mentioned for the self-governing alliance mode, the additional ratification 
step adds greater coordination between tl1e non-alliance policies and the alliance, since the 
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alliance is not allowed to implement choices that might be very detrimental to one of the finns. 
Finally, the integrated mode, with a single decision maker, achieves full coordination across all 
decisions. 
To measure in our simulations the amount of coordination that is provided by the various 
governance modes given a particular interdependence pattem and organizational capability level, 
we observe the number of times that a coordination failure occurs. We measure coordination 
failures as incidents in which total profits decline from the prior period. Thus, in such a period, 
the various agents implemented policy changes that in their entirety reduced overall profits, a 
clear form of coordination failure. 
We now tum our attention to exploration. Exploration is affected by both the governance 
structure and the organizational capability level. Different structures create different degrees of 
exploration by imposing higher or lower levels of decision-making constraints on agents. In the 
modular case, for example, the two agents act purely independently, without regard to the effects 
that their actions may have on the other finn' s perfonnance. Such independence can result in very 
high exploration. In contrast, the integrated firm, always having to take all ramifications into 
account, tends to be much less explorative. Exploration supply for the alliance modes lies in 
between. The self-governing mode creates exploration through the unfettered alliance agent, who 
is allowed to move first and implement choices from a purely parochial point of view. The 
ratified alliance structure, one would expect, creates less exploration. In this case, while the 
alliance is still allowed to make parochial evaluations of alternatives, the ratification step 
dampens tl1e exploration the firms engage in. Table 1, Panel C summarizes this discussion. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
The effects of organizational capabilities on exploration are straightforward at tl1e level of 
individual agents. An increase in the search radius increases the range of possible alternatives that 
an agent might consider, and thus increases exploration. Likewise, an increase in the nmnber of 
alternatives that an agent considers increases, at least in tl1e short run, tl1e area of the landscape an 
agent might explore. How an increase in exploration at the level of individual agents translates, 
however, to exploration at the level of tl1e organization can be less straightforward. For instance, 
as Siggelkow and Rivkin (2006) have shown, increases in exploration at a low-level within a 
hierarchical organization can backfire and create less exploration for tl1e organization as a whole. 
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To measure in our simulations the degree to which exploration is supplied by different 
combinations of governance structures and organizational capabilities for different 
interdependence patterns, we create two measures: percent of choices evaluated, and number of 
sticking points. We construct the percent of choices evaluated by calculating the total number of 
different contribution values (C;'s) considered by agents in the system over time, and dividing 
this by the total number of contribution values that exist for a landscape. (For instance, Pattern 1 
involves 144 contribution values while Pattern 4 involves 49,152 contribution values.) The 
second exploration metric, sticking points, measures the nmnber of points on the landscape from 
which the fmn will not make a move (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). Higher values of this metric 
suggest a governance structure-capability combination that is less prone to broader exploration. 
Optimal governance with varying interdependence 
Anned with a more detailed understanding of exploration and coordination supplies and 
demands, and with our battery of coordination and exploration measures, we now return to a 
more in-depth discussion of the Pattern 1 and 4 results. We begin with Pattern 1; Table 2 reports 
the perfonnance results for Pattern 1 at periods 10 and 200, along with the metrics discussed 
above for exploration and coordination. We begin by noting that this pattern, being fully 
decomposable, requires little coordination and exploration. On tllis pattern, for any given level of 
organizational capability, all governance modes perfonn equally well in tl1e long run, reaching 
the same level of performance over time. There are instances, however, in which performance 
differs across modes in the short run. 
To understand the sources of tl1e perfonnance differences, we tum to the metrics for 
coordination and exploration. A'i the right-most column of Table 2 indicates, none of the 
governance modes experiences any coordination failure on tl1is pattern. As a result, perfonnance 
variation is solely driven by differences in exploration generated by the different modes. As a 
matter of fact, the performance ordering of the four governance modes in period 10, for all levels 
of organizational capability, is exactly the ordering along tl1e exploration metric percent C!l 
choices evaluated by period 10. For instance, for capability level A, this exploration metric is 
lowest for the integrated mode at 25%, and highest for the self-governing and ratified alliance 
modes at 40%, with the modular mode in between at 35%. This is consistent with tl1e ordering of 
perfonnance values at period 10. 
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T11e perfonnance benefits in early periods for the alliance modes illustrate the benefit of 
splitting activities among different agents in the system; because the various activities can be 
easily decomposed in this pattern, a larger nmnber of agents who can work in parallel results in a 
higher degree of exploration without resulting in coordination failures across activities. In the 
long run, however, at Period 200, the four governance modes reach the same level of exploration, 
and indeed the same level of performance. 
With this simple pattern of interdependence, increases in organizational capabilities also 
create expected effects. An increase in the search radius (moving from capability level A to level 
C) leads primarily to an increase in long-run exploration and, consequently, to higher long-run 
perfonnance levels. The percent ~f choices evaluated metric increases from about 45% in level A 
to about 81% for level C; likewise, the number of sticking points decline for all governance 
modes from about 18 to 2. At tl1e same time, an increase in the nmnber of alternatives considered 
(capability levels A to B , and C to D) results primarily in increased speed with which the various 
governance modes converge to the long-run performance level. With capability levels B and D, 
for all governance modes, the measures of exploration and perfonnance are essentially identical 
between periods 10 and 200. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
A". we had seen previously, results for Pattern 4, the fully interdependent pattern, are 
much more complex. Pattern 4 requires a high degree of both coordination and exploration. 
Moreover, as argued in Table 1, the different governance modes differ widely in both the 
coordination and exploration that they provide. We begin our discussion of Pattern 4 with 
capability level A. In tl1is case, in the short run at period 10, tl1e integrated fonn has the highest 
perfonnance, followed in order by the ratification, self-governing alliance and modular fonns. 
The coordination f ailures metric mirrors well our previous discussion of coordination supplied by 
the various governance modes (recall Table 1, Panel B): the integrated mode provides tl1e highest 
degree of coordination (0 coordination failures), followed by the ratified mode (on average 3.1 
coordination failures), the self-governing mode (6.0 failures) , and the modular mode (10.3 
failures). It is interesting to note that in this case coordination failures predict short-run 
perfonnance remarkably accurately. Moreover, this finding holds for all capability levels. Even if 
a finn has higher short-term exploration, coordination appears to trump in the short run. For 
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instance, as in Pattern 1, both the ratified and the self-governing modes have higher short-term 
exploration than the integrated mode due to the parallel search processes that they are able to 
engage in. However, more search, if uncoordinated, is likely to lead to some changes that are 
perfonnance detrimental. These changes are particularly hannful in the short run, since finns do 
not have enough time to potentially undo these maladaptive adjustments. A'> a consequence, the 
integrated finn, despite its smaller degree of short-tenn exploration, outperforms the ratified and 
self-governing (and modular) modes in the short run. 
The explanation of long-run results is more complicated as both coordination and 
exploration play critical roles. 1n the long run, finns have to engage in both to have high 
perfonnance, yet tradeoff'> arise. As the exploration and coordination metrics in Table 3 indicate, 
there is a general tradeoff between exploration and coordination: the modes that create much 
exploration, such as the modular mode, also create many coordination failures, while the modes 
that are good at coordination, such as the integrated mode, are less able to create broad 
exploration. 
Coming back to the results for capability level A, we can observe that in the long run the 
short-run perfonnance results are exactly reversed. In the long run, the modular mode has the 
highest level of perfonnance, followed by the self-governing alliance, and the ratified and 
integrated fonns. The two long-run exploration mea'>ures (percent of choices evaluated at period 
200 and tl1e number of sticking points) both confinn our previous discussion of exploration 
supplied by the various governance modes (recall Table 1, Panel C). For instance, while the 
integrated mode has 315 sticking points, tl1e modular form only gets stuck on about 84 points. 
Likewise, the modular fonn evaluates in 200 periods about 590 different contribution values 
(1.2% of all possible) while the integrated form looks at only 246 (0.5%). The differences in 
exploration are reflected in perfonnance, as in this case, the long-run exploration metrics predict 
well the performance ordering of the governance modes. 
This direct match between long-run exploration and long-run perfonnance does not hold, 
however, for all levels of organizational capability. As organizational capabilities are increased, 
their effects on coordination failures and exploration differ across governance modes. 
Consequently, the relative balance of exploration and coordination that is supplied by each mode 
changes. For instance, an increase in the search radius or the number of alternatives is an 
unambiguous good for the integrated mode. Coordination failures are unaffected (they stay at 
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zero) while exploration increases. As a result, perfonnance increases as capabilities increase. For 
all the other governance modes, however, increases in organizational capabilities are not 
unambiguously beneficial. Generally, an increase in organizational search capabilities increases 
exploration but also increases coordination failures. The more broadly managers search and the 
more alternatives they evaluate, the more likely it is that at least one manager (within the finns or 
within the alliance) will implement a change that is performance detrimental for the other agents 
in the system. For instance, for the self-governing alliance, coordination failures increase from 6 
(with Capability Level A) to 22 (for Capability Levels B and C) to 32 (for Capability Level D). 
Similar patterns can be observed for the ratification and the modular modes. The impact of 
increasing search capabilities at the level of the agents on long-run finn perfonnance is, hence, 
ambiguous. For instance, while the modular mode increases its exploration dramatically between 
Capability Levels A and D (the number of sticking points falls by a factor of 10 and the number 
of choices evaluated increase by a factor of 10), its coordination failures also increase by a factor 
of 7. A-; we had seen in the short-run results, if coordination failures are too prevalent, 
exploration does not yield perfonnance benefits: while it is helpful to search more broadly, if the 
outcome of the search is uncoordinated, fmns' perfonnances will suffer. As a result, the long-run 
perfonnance of the modular mode actually decreases from 0.842 to 0. 747 as organizational 
capabilities are increased from Level A to Level D. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
In sum, the results highlight several key points. First, as suggested by Proposition 3, the 
match between exploration and coordination demands and supply helps explain the perfonnance 
outcomes ofthe various governance modes. In Pattern 1, in which little coordination was needed, 
perfonnance differences among modes is well explained, both in the short and the long run, by 
the degree of exploration that is supplied. In Pattern 4, in which coordination demands are very 
high, coordination supply plays a pivotal role in explaining performance. For short-run 
perfonnance, it tracks perfonnance perfectly. For long-run performance, if exploration is very 
low (as with capability level A), exploration can trump coordination in explaining performance 
differences; otherwise, coordination again appears to be more important in explaining 
perfonnance. Second, in the absence of many interdependencies, increases in organizational 
search capabilities are beneficial for all governance modes. In the presence of rich interactions, 
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however, increases in organizational search capabilities can backfire. Even though increases in 
organizational capabilities may have counterintuitive effects on perfonnance, their effects can be 
explained by their consequences on exploration and coordination. While exploration increases 
with greater organizational search capabilities, coordination failures increase as well. 
Consequently, performance can suffer. 
Results for Patterns 2 and 3 can be s imilarly explained. How ever, rather tl1an discussing 
each simulation separately, we summarize our results compactly by reporting (in Table 4) tl1e 
results of OLS regressions of performance (smn of Firm 1 and Finn 2) on our measures of 
exploration (percent qf choices evaluated) and coordination (coordination failures). The 
underlying dataset pools observations at eitl1er period 10 (short-run) or 200 (long-rm1) for tl1e four 
patterns, four governance modes an d four capability levels. We thus have 640,000 observations 
for the short-run and the long-run regressions (4 x 4 x 4 x 10,000 simulations). To control for 
pattern-level influences on performance we include pattern dmnmies for Patterns 2-4 (tlms 
Pattern 1 is tl1e baseline); to examine the varying role of coordination and exploration as the 
degree of interdependence changes we include interaction effects for tlu~se dmnmies with tl1e 
coordination and exploration measures. Since there are no coordination f ailures on Pattern 1, 
coordination is only interacted w itl1 Pattern 3 and Pattern 4, so that Pattern 2 is tl1e baseline in this 
case. For a given pattern, tl1e effect of either coordination or exploration is tlms captured by the 
sum of the main effect and the pattern interaction. 
The results in Table 4 confirm more systematically a nmnber of observations we had 
made in our prior discussion. First, as interdependencies increase, coordination becomes 
increasingly important: the interaction of coordination fa ilures witl1 tl1e pattern dummies, for 
example, is significantly greater in magnitude for Pattern 4 tlmn w ith Pattern 3. Witl1 increasingly 
dense interactions, coordination becomes paramount in explaining perfonnance. Second, 
exploration is always important, but becomes less so with h igher degrees of interaction. These 
results are true for botl1 tl1e short- and long-rm1, witl1 coordination even more important for 
higher-interaction patterns in tl1e long-run. 9 Figure 6 illustrates tl1e economic significance of tl1ese 
regression results, graphing tl1e magnitude of tl1e perfonnance change associated with a one 
9 All coefficients are significant with p<O.OOl: in addition, for each specification, all coefficient<; are 
significantly different from one another with p<O.OOl, with the exception of the inte raction terms 
P3 *exploration and P4*exploration for period 10, where the significance of the difference between these two 
variables is with p<0.05. 
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standard deviation change in either coordination or exploration.10 As this figure illustrates, for 
denser patterns coordination can become even more critical than exploration. 
This last result is noteworthy. Most research on the value of exploration has stressed the 
positive relationship between the value of exploration and the degree of interdependency (e.g., 
Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007). While we confinn this relationship, we find that in an inter-
organizational setting coordination may actually become even more important than exploration. 
Exploration per se, when not coordinated, can backfire. 
Insert Table 4 and Figure 6 about here 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have sought to better understand how modes of governance affect the 
perfonnance of firms in alliance relationships. While collaboration is an important component of 
finn strategy, and a growing body of work has focused on determinants of governance choice in 
this setting, there is limited empirical evidence concerning the link between mode choice and finn 
perfonnance. We drew from a body of work that has used simulation methodologies to address 
issues central to strategy and organization design. In the remainder of this section we review our 
core results and theoretical predictions; discuss assumptions made in our model; and end with a 
discussion of how our study relates to and contributes to the literature in this area. 
Results and theoretical predictions 
We begin by reviewing our core results, noting how they relate to the propositions which were 
derived from the prior literature, and offering a set of specific predictions for future work. ln 
many cases our analysis has enabled us to uncover additional nuance relative to the propositions 
that can help guide future theoretical and empirical research. Beginning with Proposition 1, we 
find that the pattern of interdependence among the activities of finns engaged in an alliance does 
have a crucial impact on the optimal governance structure. ln addition to confinning this 
prediction, we also find that the time horizon over which firms seek to maximize their 
1
° For ease of comparison, the deviation decrease in coordination f ailures negative of the coordination failure 
effects are shown; thus the figure shows the effect of a one standard deviation increase in exploration, and a one 
standard. 
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perfonnance has an important effect on optimal governance as well: as we saw with the fully 
interdependent pattern and capability level A (Figure 5), governance modes that create high 
short-tenn performance may not yield high long-tenn perfonnance, and vice versa. Thus, 
knowing the pattern of interdependence alone may not suffice to decide on the optimal 
governance mode. 
Consistent with Propositions 2a and 2b, we find that the need for and supply of 
coordination and exploration is affected by the pattern of interdependence, governance modes and 
organizational search capabilities. We discover considerable subtlety, however, on the supply 
side, as governance choice and search capabilities interact with one another. As we saw in Table 
3, increases in organizational search capabilities can increase exploration but also coordination 
failures. Moreover, the degree to which search capabilities increase coordination failures is 
strongly mediated by the governance mode. For instance, while the integrated mode was 
unaffected, coordination failures in the modular mode soared with increases in organizational 
search capabilities. This interaction can make simple predictions as to which governance mode 
provides more coordination difficult. For instance, while the degree of coordination failures 
generally followed the trend we anticipated in Panel B of Table 1 (most coordination is provided 
by the integrated mode, followed by the ratified alliance, the self-governing alliance, and the 
modular mode), we found situations in which the ratified alliance actually creates more 
coordination failures than the self-governing alliance. This happens in particular when 
interdependencies are nmnerous and agents evaluate many alternatives (see Table 3, capability 
levels B and D).11 
Finally, consistent with the argmnents leading to Proposition 3, we find that finn 
perfonnance in an alliance relationship improves when coordination and exploration needs are 
matched with coordination and exploration supplied. Our results , however, also reveal that the 
match on the coordination and the exploration dimension is not always equally important. As the 
11 The reason for why the ratified alliance has more coordination failures in this case than the self-governing 
alliance is quite subtle. Recall, in the ratified alliance, the managers of the non-alliance activities move first. 
Given high interdependency and many alternatives considered, it is likely that at least one manager will find and 
implement a change that is performance enhancing for her own firm, but potentially performance destroying for 
the other firm. In the self-governing alliance, the alliance moves first. In this case, the alliance achieves higher 
performance (since they can optimize parochially and do not need ratification). This higher performance 
increases the bar for the non-alliance managers for finding a better alternative. (Recall, non-alliance managers 
take 112 of the alliance performance into account in making evaluations). /\s a result, in this case, non-alliance 
managers are Jess likely to find a (parochially) performance enhancing move which, given the high 
interdependency, could undermine the performance of the other firm. 
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degree of interdependence increases, the value of having a good match on the coordination 
dimension increases. For very high levels of interdependence, coordination can actually trump 
exploration. Even though high levels of interdependence require a high degree of exploration, 
unless this exploration is tied to coordination, it can be ineffective. 
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, empirical results concerning the perfonnance 
impact of alliances are mixed; moreover, there exists only limited empirical evidence examining 
the perfonnance implications of alternate modes of governance. The results of our model suggest 
that clear-cut empirical results may require a greater focus on the interaction of factors such as 
interdependence, capabilities and governance mode. In particular, our results offer three specific 
predictions that could guide future empirical work: 
( 1) ln the absence of strong organizational search capabilities, when activity 
interdependence is pervasive, the perfonnance benefit of a fully-integrated alliance 
governance mode relative to less-integrated modes will decline over time. 
(2) When activity interdependence is pervasive, in alliances with weak coordinating 
mechanisms, fmn performance may decline as finns' search capabilities become 
stronger. 
(3) When activity interdependence is pervasive, the relative importance of selecting high-
coordination governance modes as compared to high-exploration modes will 
mcrease. 
Simulation model assumptions 
We next discuss several assumptions embedded in our model and elaborate on the implications 
for our results (and for future extensions) of relaxing some of these assumptions. First, we 
modeled an alliance situation with two firms. lt is not uncommon, however, for alliances to 
involve more than two finns. In such cases, we would expect that similar issues of coordination 
and exploration would come into play. The main question, then, is how firms can design a set of 
governance structures that take into account the complexities associated with having a greater 
nmnber of involved parties. For instance, an appropriate methodology for ratifYing joint decisions 
in such a setting would likely involve a more complex set of rules given the larger number of 
players. At the same time, we would expect that the core issue is likely to be the same as in a two-
finn setting: how can the need for coordination and exploration arising from the pattern of inter-
30 
finn interdependence be matched with the supply of coordination and exploration arising from 
inter-firm governance of decision-making and finn capabilities? 
A second modeling assumption involves the portion of the alliance profit each fmn takes 
into account in making decisions (the parameter <X in our model). In our analysis, we have 
assumed that both firms put equal weight on alliance perfonnance. One might imagine, however, 
situations in which the alliance is considered of greater importance by one finn than by the other. 
How are our results affected in such a situation? We take a first cut at exploring this by 
examining our results in the case where Firm I ha'i <X= 0.75 and Finn 2 has ex= 0.25 (for the 
alliance modes). Re-running our model on Patterns I and 4, and focusing on the two alliance 
modes (self-governing and ratified), we fmd that, as expected, on Pattern I there are no 
significant differences between the original, 'balanced' alliance results and the alternative, 
'asymmetric' alliance results (due to the lack of interdependencies between the alliance and non-
alliance activities). With Pattern 4, however, we find an interesting set of results: alliance 
asytmnetry reduces the performance of Firm I (with the 0.75 weight), while increasing the 
perfonnance of Finn 2, for both the self-governing and ratified modes. The finn with a higher 
emphasis on the alliance suffers largely because the other finn now has a stronger incentive to 
implement choices that improve perfonnance of its non-alliance activities (N2) but that are 
detrimental to the alliance and hence to the other finn. (Since ex is low, Finn 2 bears less of the 
negative externality it imposes onto the alliance.) This parochial behavior can lead to situations in 
which even joint profits are lower than in the symmetric case. These results raise the question for 
future research of how fmns can create modes with effective coordination when finns differ in 
the degree to which they consider the joint alliance to be important. 
A third modeling assumption relates to the implications of pre-defining a task allocation 
structure. Because we pre-specify the tasks that comprise the alliance, we are effectively making 
the choice of alliance scope exogenous. This choice, however, is likely intertwined with a host of 
other issues related to interdependence, finn capabilities and governance mode. We conducted 
several robustness analyses to better understand the implications of thinking about alliance 
boundaries in this way. The task decomposition we have used in this paper has been a 4-4-4 split 
between Finn I, the Alliance and Finn 2. We evaluated two alternative task decomposition 
structures: a 5-2-5 and a 3-6-3 structure, on which we examined the results ofthe self-governing 
and ratified alliance modes. The results suggest that the alliance boundary issue can be explained 
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in connection with the governance structures: the results of the 5-2-5 structure closely resemble 
the modular results, while the 3-6-3 structure creates results that tend to resemble those of the 
integrated mode. Thus, while the choice of boundaries may in reality be an endogenous 
consideration for finns, we can think about these as more continuous versions of the governance 
structures. The modes we evaluate, therefore, represent discrete points among the continumn of 
choices available to finns, with task allocation being subsumed as an issue within the governance 
structure decision. 
Lastly, we should note that our findings have parallels with results from prior efforts 
using quite different simulation methods to address organizational issues. Burton and Obel ( 1980; 
1984), for example, utilize a decomposed linear programming methodology (Dantzig (1963); 
Baumol and Fabian (1964)) to address intra-finn organization issues. They find that finn 
perfonnance under alternate divisional forms (e.g., M-fonn vs. U-fonn) is influenced by the 
degree of decomposability of the fmn's underlying technology. 1n particular, their results suggest 
that the benefits of the more decentralized M-fonn structure are more apparent for more nearly 
decomposable technologies. This relates to our own finding, where on Pattern 1, which is fully 
decomposable, the more decentralized 'ratification' mode perfonns better than the more 
centralized ' integrated' mode (with the opposite generally true on the less decomposable Pattern 
4). lt is reassuring to note that different modeling approaches can result in parallels such as these. 
On the other hand, different approaches can also lead to new insights, as our results linking 
variation in interdependencies of various types (within and across firms and their alliance 
activities) with alternate alliance governance structures suggests. 
Contributions and implications 
Our study has a number of implications for theory and future research in this area. The 
observation that coordination challenges can trmnp exploration in inter-organizational settings 
underscores the importance of evaluating the contingent implications of interdependence when 
structuring cooperative relationships. This is consistent with Gulati and Singh's (1998) discussion 
of coordination as a relevant concern when structuring alliance governance. Moreover, because 
we abstract away from the technology and industry-related factors that underlie transaction cost-
related considerations of appropriability (e.g., Pisano, 1989; Oxley, 1997) we can focus more 
specifically on identifying the sources of coordination and exploration supply, allowing a more 
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targeted approach to understanding the tradeoffs associated with governance mode design. For 
example, while some prior work has drawn on arguments related to capabilities and 
interdependence in discussing the determinants of governance mode, much of this work has 
utilized fairly broad proxies for hierarchical controls such as the use of equity (e.g., Colombo, 
2003). Having a more contingent view of the potential implications of specific governance mode 
design considerations (as we attempt to do in this paper) can enable more targeted research 
approaches. 
A core set of results in this study relates to the ways in which governance structure 
interacts with organizational search capabilities. These results are particularly intriguing given the 
attention paid to the role of firm-level factors such as alliance capabilities in recent studies. For 
example, Kale et al. (2002), building on the idea that greater alliance experience can have 
positive performance effects (Anand and Khanna, 2000), discuss the role of a 'dedicated alliance 
function ' in capturing and managing alliance-relate knowledge, suggesting that such a function 
can enable the development of alliance capabilities through learning and evolutionary processes 
(March, 1991; Nelson and Winter, 1982).1n much the same spirit, Zollo et al. (2002) develop the 
idea of inter-organizational routines, which also follow a similar evolutionary path. Our concept 
of organizational search capabilities shares a number of features with these various concepts: they 
are assets tied to the finn and developed over time that endow finn agents with superior 
evaluation capabilities in the context of inter-organizational relationships. Whereas prior studies 
have generally stressed the positive relationship between alliance capabilities and firm 
perfonnance, our analysis suggests that there are contingencies under which investments in the 
development of these capabilities may actually backfire. 
This paper also contributes to the broader conversation around the performance 
consequences of inter-organizational relationships. Various streams of prior work have examined 
the effects of alliances on different metrics of firm perfonnance, looking at outcomes such as firm 
survival (e.g., Bamn and Oliver, 1991), innovation output (e.g., Shan et al., 1994) and stock 
market valuation (Das et al. , 1998). While these studies generally find positive effects, albeit with 
a range of contingencies, other studies paint a more mixed view, for example when comparing 
inter-organizational relationships with firm capabilities with respect to their impact on 
perfonnance (e.g., Lee et al., 2001). Much of the variance in alliance-related firm performance 
outcomes is likely due to partner and inter-finn characteristics (e.g., Stuart, 2000); by illustrating 
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how factors such as search capabilities and interdependence can influence the governance-
perfonnance link, our study can shed new light on this area, with future work focused more 
specifically on empirically testing the predictions of our model. 
A key aim of this paper ha'i been to develop a set of insights that can be used to guide 
future empirical work. In this context, the use of factors such as inter-organizational patterns of 
interdependence does increase the burden of collecting empirical data that is more fine-grained 
and complex. At the same time, however, the simulation results can help generate more refined 
hypotheses that have the opposite effect of simplifying the data collection task. With more 
specific priors (e.g., in more interdependent settings, modes that enable greater coordination are 
preferred to modes that enable greater exploration), future work can explore the governance 
implications of inter-organizational collaboration in a more targeted way using empirical and 
case-based studies. 
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These figures graph performance (vertical axis) for the two-tirm system over time periods 0 to 200 
(horizontal axis) tor the tour governance modes on Interdependence Pattern 1 (fully decomposable), with 
varying levels of organizational capabilities. Each point on each line represents the average of 10,000 
simulation runs. MOD, SGA, RAT and INT rcter to the modular, self-governing alliance, ratified alliance, 
and integrated torms, respectively. 
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Figure 5 
Performance levels of four governance modes: interdependence pattern 4 
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These figures graph pcrtormancc (vertical axis) tor the two-firm system over time periods 0 to 200 
(horizontal axis) tor the tour governance modes on Intcrdcpcndcncc Pattern 4 (full interdependence), with 
varying levels of organizational capabilities. Each point on each line represents the average of 10,000 
simulation runs. MOD, SGA, RAT and INT rcter to the modular, self-governing all iancc, ratiticd alliance, 
and integrated torms, respectively. 
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Magnitude of coordination and exploration effects 
Performance impact, period 10: 
Effect of a one standard deviation change in coordination or exploration 
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Performance impact, period 200: 
Effect of a one standard deviation change in coordination or exploration 
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These figures show the change in performance associated with a one standard deviation change in 
coordination or exploration. Values arc calculated using the estimated coefficients from Table 5 evaluated 
at the mean value of coordination (coordination failures) and exploration (percent of choices evaluated) 
tor each pattern. Coordination values shown represent the negative of the coordination failures cftcct to 
facilitate exposition. 
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Table 1 
Demand and supply of coordination and exploration 
A. Level of coordination and exploration demanded by the interdependence pattern 
Coordination Demanded 
Between Firms 1, 2 
and Alliance Within Alliance Between Firms 1, 2 
Pattern 1 None Little None 
Pattern 2 None High None 
Pattern 3 High High None 
Pattern 4 High High High 
Exploration 
Demanded 
(Number of 
Local Peaks) 
18 
35 
198 
315 
B. Level of coordination supplied by governance modes 
MOD 
Between 
Firms 1, 2 
and Alliance 
Low 
Within 
Alliance 
Low 
Between 
Firms 1, 2 
None 
Sources of 
Coordination Supply 
• No formal mechanism, but individual 
firms control subset of alliance activities 
SGA Low High None • Sequential moves within period 
• Firms consider alliance performance 
- ""'""-"" '''''_"_""'- ""'"'- '''' "''- " '''''- ""'"'- ""-""-" " ' " "-"-" " _ "_"""'"-""_" _ ''"-"-" " _ "_""" '""_ "_" _ " "-""- "'" ""_"_ " " _" _ _ , __ , _ _ ,.. __ ,,.,,,._,, __ , _ _ m••-•••••- •••••• - •m••-••••• - • •••••-••••••- ••-•-• •••••• • - •••• 
RAT Medium High None • Sequential moves within period 
• Firms consider alliance performance 
-·····----- ····----···- ···-···- ···- ···-- ··------------··-----·····------ ··-----··-----····· -----····· ----- ··------····------~--~.Y~~~?.~~!~B.~----- · ------------·-·-- -- · --- · - -- ·-
INT High High High • Single decision maker 
C. Level of exploration supplied b)· governance modes 
Exploration Exploration 
Level Influences 
MOD, SGA, RAT and INT rcter to the modular, self-governing alliance, ratified alliance, and integrated 
governance modes, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Performance, exploration and coordination, interdependence pattern 1 
Capability 
Level 
A 
Gov. 
Mode 
Degree of Exploration 
Percent of Choices I Sticking Coordination 
t--""':"":'-......---::-:--:--i·· .. ··-···__!:,val.~-~-~~~-~- · -···· . ...J Points Failures 
p. lO p.200 p.1 0 . p.200 . 
Performance 
MOD 0.898 0.931 34.7 45.2 18.0 0 
SGA 0.916 0.930 40.1 45.2 20.3 0 
RAT 0.917 0.931 40.0 45.2 19.0 0 
, INT 0.849 , 0.931 25.3 , 45.2 , 18.5 0 
- ··-·· -·- ·-·- ........ ·Man-· · -· ·a:9sT·· ·--<- ····o:9sT·-- ···- ss.3·- ···•···· · ·· ·ss .·3·· ···  ........ _i7~9···-- ·-··-· ··-··· o-· ·-·-· ··-
sGA 0.951 0.951 55.3 55.3 19.8 0 
RAT 0.951 0.951 55.3 55.3 18.5 0 B 
-·-··-·-··-·-·"··-·-··-·~·· ·~-""" -··· .. ~~ t~-··"-1-"""-~"~~~-- ..... -~~ :~-..... , .... '" .~;:-~·· ""' ·t-·"··-\~:{-··--· ··-··-·····-·- -~-·····-·-· .. -·-
SGA 0.944 0.986 53.6 81.4 2.5 0 
RAT 0.944 0.986 53.6 81.4 2.3 0 c 
-·······-······-·-····· -·-····-· ...····~ri- ···· -- -~~~~~-· - t····· ··%·~~~·--- ···-~~ :~·-··• ···· '' ·~~:-~-· "'' '" ~-·····-~-~~-····-- ··-··-······-·······~-···· ·· ·-·-··· ··-
SGA 0.993 0.993 89.6 89.6 2.3 0 
RAT 0.993 0.993 89.6 89.6 2.0 0 D 
INT 0.990 0.990 90.7 90.7 2.2 0 
MOD, SGA, RAT and INT rcter to the modular, self-governing alliance, ratified alliance, and integrated 
forms, respectively. Performance refers to the sum of Firm 1 and Firm 2 performance at periods 10 and 
200. Exploration is measured using two different mctrics: ( 1) percent of choices evaluated: the running 
total of all contribution values accessed by the two firms at periods 10 and 200 as a result of the firms' 
decision making processes divided by the total number of such values on the landscape; and (2) sticking 
points: the average number of points on the landscape from which the two-firm system will not move. 
Coordination failures arc measured as the number of periods between the beginning of the simulation and 
period 200 that total profit (Firm 1 and Firm 2) declines from one period to the next. All measures (except 
sticking points) arc evaluated and averaged across 10,000 simulat ions. Sticking points arc averaged over 
100 simulation runs. 
*Pattern 1 has a total of 144 possible contribution values that can be evaluated. 
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Table 3 
Performance, exploration and coordination, interdependence pattern 4 
Capability 
Level 
A 
Gov. 
Mode 
Degree of Exploration 
Percent of Choices I 
Evaluated* ! Sticking 
t-----.-----i·· .. ··- ···- .. - · ............ ........... .... > Points 
Performance 
p. lO p.200 p.10 p.200 
Coordination 
Failures 
MOD 0.747 0.842 0.3 1.2 83.8 10.3 
SGA 0.768 0.833 0.4 1.0 97.5 6.0 
RAT 0.784 0.829 0.3 0.7 193.1 3.1 
TNT ... __ _ Q:.?_?.§ __ -.!- . _  0_:_~~5? __ ___ _ 9 -~ -- ··: .... ... _9.: ~-. _ ... .. !... .. _]}.~.:_!____ ........ ________ 9__ ·----..... . 
- -----------·· --j--M-on- o.731 j o.761 1.2 ! 1.7 j 83.8 47.0 
SGA 0.790 . 0.807 1.0 . 1.1 . 97.5 21.9 B RAT 0.776 0.781 0.9 0.9 193.1 30.5 
TNT 0.845 0.845 0.7 0.7 315.1 0 
-·-··-·----·-···· -·-··-·r-·-··M-a-o····----· .. o:74o··· .. --r--· ..-o.iis·-- .... ·- ·a.3·- ·· ... , .... · ..·4:3··· ·-··r-· .. ··--s·~-.s- ··--· --------------35~7·----- .. ·----
sGA 0.760 0.865 0.5 3.6 20.4 21.6 
RAT 0.781 0.873 0.5 2.2 50.1 9.6 c 
- ...... --- ---- • .L. ... -~!. __ ... -· .Q:ll_QQ __ --'-· _  <!:~2.? -- ···- ·9 .3 .. _ . .! .... .. . .?.: ~-... " .. L.. ..... -~ .. !.:2 ..... ___ -----________ 9__ ·---
MOD 0.690 . 0.747 4.6 . 12.3 . 8.5 71.6 
SGA 0.780 0.831 3.0 4.6 20.4 32.4 
RAT 0.781 0.795 2.6 3.0 50.1 42.9 D 
TNT 0.912 0.912 4.0 4.0 51.9 0 
MOD, SGA, RAT and TNT rctcr to the modular, self-governing alliance, ratified alliance, and integrated 
forms, respectively. Performance rctcrs to the sum of Firm 1 and Firm 2 performance at periods 10 and 
200. Exploration is measured using two different mctrics: ( 1) percent of choices evaluated: the running 
total of all contribution values accessed by the two tirms at periods 10 and 200 as a result of the tirms' 
decision making processes divided by the total number of such values on the landscape; and (2) sticking 
points: the average number of points on the landscape from which the two-tirm system will not move. 
Coordination failures arc measured as the number of periods between the beginning of the simulation and 
period 200 that total profit (Firm 1 and Firm 2) declines from one period to the next. All measures (except 
sticking points) arc evaluated and averaged across 10,000 simulat ions. Sticking points arc avcmgcd over 
100 simulation runs. 
*Pattern 4 has a total of49,152 possible contribution values that can be evaluated. 
46 
Table 4 
Relative effects of coordination and exploration 
Dependent variable: (4-1) (4-2) 
Per/(Jrmance period 10 period 200 
Coordination failure -0.156 [0.002] -0.161 [0.001] 
Exploration 0.189 [0.001] 0.135 [0.001] 
P2 dummy -0.012 [0.001] -0.016 [0.001] 
P3 dummy -0.005 [0.001] -0.010 [0.001] 
P4 dummy -0.028 [0.001] -0.01 1 [0.001] 
P3 * coord.failure -0.085 [0.002] -0.105 [0.002] 
P4 * coord. failure -0.191 [0.002] -0.269 [0.002] 
P2 * e.Tploration 0.013 [0.001] 0.013 [0.001] 
P3 * e.Tploration 0.948 [0.008] 0.528 [0.005] 
P4 * e.Tploration 0.871 [0.013] 0.276 [0.004] 
Constant 0.830 [0.0011 0.873 [0.0011 
ModelR- 0.518 0.574 
This table shows OLS regressions offirm performance (sum of Firm 1 and Firm 2) at period 10 or period 
200. Exploration is measured by percent of choices evaluated and coordination failure is measured by 
coordination failure percent. All coefficients arc s igniticant at the p < 0.001 level. Each spccitication 
contains 640,000 observations: 4 patterns, 4 governance modes and 4 capability levels, across 10,000 
simulations. 
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